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ENTREPRENEURS ON HORSEBACK: 
REFLECTIONS ON THE ORGANIZATION OF 
LAW 
Darian M. Ibrahim & D. Gordon Smith* 
“Law and entrepreneurship” is an emerging field of study. Skeptics might wonder 
whether law and entrepreneurship is a variant of that old canard, the Law of the 
Horse. In this Essay, we defend law and entrepreneurship against that charge and 
urge legal scholars to become even more engaged in the wide-ranging scholarly 
discourse regarding entrepreneurship. In making our case, we argue that research 
at the intersection of entrepreneurship and law is distinctive. In some instances, 
legal rules and practices are tailored to the entrepreneurial context, and in other 
instances, general rules of law find novel expression in the entrepreneurial 
context. As a result, studying connections between law and entrepreneurship offers 
unique insights about them both. 
 
Whenever we confess our interest in “law and entrepreneurship” to a new 
group of people, someone in the group inevitably makes reference to the now-
hackneyed joke about the “Law of the Horse.”1 Harold Koh describes the standard 
version of the joke: 
 When I first came to Yale Law School more than two 
decades ago to teach International Business Transactions, then-Dean 
Harry Wellington suggested that international business law is like 
that famous non-book, The Law of the Horse, which consists of 
                                                                                                                
    * Associate Professor of Law, University of Arizona James E. Rogers College 
of Law; Glen L. Farr Professor of Law, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young 
University. This Essay was inspired in part by conversations at the First Annual Law & 
Entrepreneurship Retreat, held on May 21, 2007 at the University of Wisconsin Law 
School. The Authors thank David Armond, Bobby Bartlett, Brian Broughman, Vic 
Fleischer, Cliff Fleming, Larry Garvin, George Geis, Jim Gordon, Mike Guttentag, Bob 
Lawless, Toni Massaro, Nate Oman, Jim Rasband, Michael Risch, Brett Scharffs, Daniel 
Sokol, and Lynn Wardle for helpful discussions and comments on this Essay. 
    1. Attentive readers will have noted our textual pun, referring to The Law of the 
Horse as “hackneyed.” In addition to its adjective form meaning “trite” or “banal,” the noun 
“Hackney” refers to an English breed of horses, and “hackney” is a generic term for a 
trotting horse. 
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Chapter I: “Contracting for a Horse”; Chapter II: “Owning a Horse”; 
Chapter III: “Torts by a Horse”; and Chapter IV: “Litigating over a 
Horse.”2  
The short of the critique, of course, is that the horse is not a very useful organizing 
principle for the study of law. 
Some might also question the value of organizing a field of legal study 
around entrepreneurship. In this Essay, we observe that entrepreneurship is an 
important social and economic phenomenon that has attracted the attention of 
scholars in many disciplines,3 including some recent work by legal scholars.4 We 
then offer reasons why law and entrepreneurship should be considered a discrete 
field of legal study, and we urge legal scholars to become even more engaged in 
the wide-ranging scholarly discourse over entrepreneurship.5 As applied to law and 
entrepreneurship, therefore, the Law of the Horse is “a catchy put-down, but with 
very little substance.”6 
The Law of the Horse is routinely raised in discussions of new areas of 
legal study—for example, transnational law,7 health law,8 and information law9—
in large part because of the notoriety brought to the joke by Judge Frank 
                                                                                                                
    2. Harold Hongju Koh, Is There a “New” New Haven School of International 
Law?, 32 YALE J. INT’L L. 559, 572 n.85 (2007). The joke may have originated with Karl 
Llewellyn. In an “introductory lecture” on the law of sales given at Columbia Law School 
and later published in the Harvard Law Review, Llewellyn argued that the horse played a 
crucial role in the development of the law of sales. K. N. Llewellyn, Across Sales on 
Horseback, 52 HARV. L. REV. 725 (1939). The horse enters Llewellyn’s tale via the English 
case of Stuart v. Wilkins, 99 Eng. Rep. 15 (K.B. 1778), which involved a remedy for breach 
of implied warranty in connection with the sale of a horse. Llewellyn attempts to “unhorse” 
the law of sales in a companion essay. K. N. Llewellyn, The First Struggle to Unhorse 
Sales, 52 HARV. L. REV. 873 (1939) [hereinafter Llewellyn, The First Struggle]. 
    3. See infra notes 53–55 and accompanying text. 
    4. See infra notes 62–65. 
    5. “Law and entrepreneurship” is quite different in orientation from “law and 
economics,” “law and sociology,” “law and psychology,” and other interdisciplinary efforts. 
Rather than applying the tools of another discipline to law, the study of “law and 
entrepreneurship” examines the influence of law on entrepreneurial behavior and 
entrepreneurial behavior on law. Thus, one might use economics, sociology, psychology, 
and other disciplines to study “law and entrepreneurship.” 
    6. Henry T. Greely, Some Thoughts on Academic Health Law, 41 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 391, 406 (2006) (addressing the Law-of-the-Horse critique of health law); 
cf. Einer R. Elhauge, Can Health Law Become a Coherent Field of Law?, 41 WAKE FOREST 
L. REV. 365, 368 (2006) (confessing to “have always found this analogy more clever than 
illuminating”). 
    7. Harold Hongju Koh, The Globalization of Freedom, 26 YALE J. INT’L L. 305, 
305 (2001). 
    8. Elhauge, supra note 6, at 365; Greely, supra note 6, at 404; Mark A. Hall, 
The History and Future of Health Care Law: An Essentialist View, 41 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 347, 355–56 (2006). 
    9. Jacqueline Lipton, A Framework for Information Law and Policy, 82 OR. L. 
REV. 695, 699 (2003). 
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Easterbrook’s attack on the “Law of Cyberspace.”10 Judge Easterbrook’s principal 
objections to cyberlaw11 comprised its supposed narrowness (“the best way to 
learn the law applicable to specialized endeavors is to study general rules”)12 and 
its lack of depth: 
Lots of cases deal with sales of horses; others deal with people 
kicked by horses; still more deal with the licensing and racing of 
horses, or with the care veterinarians give to horses, or with prizes at 
horse shows. Any effort to collect these strands into a course on 
“The Law of the Horse” is doomed to be shallow and to miss 
unifying principles.13 
                                                                                                                
  10. Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 U. CHI. 
LEGAL F. 207. Larry Lessig later recounted: 
A few years ago, at a conference on the ‘Law of Cyberspace’ 
held at the University of Chicago, Judge Frank Easterbrook told the 
assembled listeners, a room packed with ‘cyberlaw’ devotees (and 
worse), that there was no more a ‘law of cyberspace’ than there was a 
‘Law of the Horse’; that the effort to speak as if there were such a law 
would just muddle rather than clarify; and that legal academics 
(‘dilettantes’) should just stand aside as judges and lawyers and 
technologists worked through the quotidian problems that this souped-up 
telephone would present. ‘Go home,’ in effect, was Judge Easterbrook’s 
welcome. 
Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 HARV. L. REV. 
501, 501 (1999) (footnote omitted). 
  11. As to the origins of this term, see Dean Colby & Robert Trager, Using 
Communication Theory to Understand Cyberlaw and its Discontents, 2005 U. ILL. J.L. 
TECH. & POL’Y 187, 187 n.2 (“The origin of the word ‘Cyberlaw’ is unclear, but the term 
was inspired by William Gibson’s novel Neuromancer, which coined the word 
‘cyberspace.’ Jonathan Rosenoer subsequently published a newsletter called CyberLaw in 
the early 1990s, and the neologism began to appear in law review articles shortly 
thereafter.” (citations omitted)). 
  12. Easterbrook, supra note 10, at 207. Judge Easterbrook also assailed the effort 
to create a “law of cyberspace” by leveling a charge of dilettantism: 
Instead of offering courses suited to dilettantes, the University of 
Chicago offered courses in Law and Economics, and Law and Literature, 
taught by people who could be appointed to the world’s top economics 
and literature departments—even win the Nobel Prize in economics, as 
Ronald Coase has done. 
I regret to report that no one at this Symposium is going to win 
a Nobel Prize any time soon for advances in computer science. We are at 
risk of multidisciplinary dilettantism, or, as one of my mentors called it, 
the cross-sterilization of ideas. Put together two fields about which you 
know little and get the worst of both worlds. 
Id. The answer to this objection is so obvious that it hardly bears stating, but in the interests 
of completeness we offer Henry Greely’s response: “Easterbrook is completely right that 
law professors should not speculate in ignorance about other fields. The right answer is not 
to withdraw from specific areas, but to learn about them, and to work closely with other 
people who are specialized in them.” Greely, supra note 6, at 405. 
  13. Easterbrook, supra note 10, at 207.  
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Whether Judge Easterbrook was right about the value of cyberlaw as a 
separate field of legal study remains a matter of vigorous debate.14 For present 
purposes, we are more interested in his method of attack than its target. We begin 
with some explication of the Law of the Horse, concluding that Judge Easterbrook 
missed the joke. What makes the Law of the Horse funny is not the narrowness or 
shallowness of the topic,15 but rather that the presence of a horse—as opposed to 
“cucumbers, cats, coal, [or] cribs”16—is not a legally relevant fact.17 
Lawyers inevitably classify cases according to specified factual 
attributes.18 Did someone make a promise? Did one person touch another person? 
                                                                                                                
  14. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory 
of Freedom of Expression for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 2 (2004) (“If 
we assume that a technological development is important to law only if it creates something 
utterly new, and we can find analogues in the past—as we always can—we are likely to 
conclude that because the development is not new, it changes nothing important.”); Lipton, 
supra note 9, at 698 (“[E]ven if there is a potential to explain cyberlaw by reference to a 
clear theoretical framework, such a framework has arguably not yet emerged in practice, at 
least in the relevant literature.”); Joseph H. Sommer, Against Cyberlaw, 15 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 1145, 1147 (2001) (“[N]ot only is ‘cyberlaw’ nonexistent, it is dangerous to 
pretend that it exists.”). 
  15. As a descriptive matter, it is far from clear that the Law of the Horse would 
be narrow or shallow. The joke itself hints at the breadth of the imaginary field, touching on 
contracts, property, torts, and the litigation process. And we presume that any credible study 
of the subject would explore general principles of law as they apply to cases involving 
horses. For a discussion of “the law of the horse” that may already exist, see infra note 17. 
  16. Easterbrook, supra note 10, at 208.  
  17. Or is it? A “law of the horse” may already exist. The University of Kentucky 
College of Law hosts the Annual National Equine Law Conference, sponsors regular 
continuing legal education programs on equine law, and is home to a student organization 
called the Equine Law Society. During the 1980s, Kentucky Law Journal twice published 
articles from an “Equine Law Symposium,” and many law review articles focusing on 
matters of equine law have been published in other scholarly journals, including a spirited 
defense of the “law of the horse.” See Joan S. Howland, Let’s Not “Spit the Bit” In Defense 
of “The Law of the Horse”: The Historical and Legal Development of American 
Thoroughbred Racing, 14 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 473 (2004). 
Beyond Kentucky, the University of Vermont maintains a website on “Equine Law and 
Horsemanship Safety.” Univ. of Vt., Equine Law and Horsemanship Safety, 
http://asci.uvm.edu/equine/law (last visited Dec. 23, 2007). And attorneys across the U.S. 
market themselves as experts in “equine law.” See, e.g., Kimberly H. Ashbach, 
http://www.ashbachlaw.com/PracticeAreas/Equine-Law.asp (last visited Dec. 23, 2007) 
(Pennsylvania attorney representing clients on “myriad of equine legal issues”); Julie I. 
Fershtman, http://www.equinelaw.net (last visited Dec. 23, 2007) (Michigan attorney 
purporting to be a “national leader in equine law”); Law Office of Mitchell E. Fox, 
http://www.foxcommerciallaw.com/PracticeAreas/Equine-Law.asp (last visited Dec. 23, 
2007) (Florida attorneys representing “horse owners, horse breeders, purchasers, sellers, 
equestrian riding schools, stables, professional trainers, and others”); see also infra note 22. 
  18. Compare Henry Greeley’s suggestion that “many time-honored law school 
subjects and legal fields are, in their own ways, laws of the horse” because they “all are 
courses and fields about the law as it is applied in specific settings, not about generalized 
law as some kind of ‘brooding omnipresence in the sky.’” Greely, supra note 6, at 405–06. 
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Whether in Roman law,19 in the English common law,20 or in the modern 
American legal system, legal taxonomies are structured around the underlying 
factual attributes of transactions.21 And “transactions involving horses” do not 
merit separate consideration.22 
                                                                                                                
  19. The great divisions of Roman law were “persons,” “things,” and “actions.” 
These divisions have been discussed at great length by scholars of Roman law, see, e.g., 
H.F. JOLOWICZ, ROMAN FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN LAW 61–81 (1978), and any attempt here 
to summarize those discussions would necessarily be woefully incomplete. Nevertheless, 
we can easily illustrate the connection between the organization of Roman law and the 
underlying factual attributes of the persons, things, or actions. 
Perhaps most obviously, “persons” (persona) referred only to humans, not juristic 
persons, like municipalities or corporations. J.A.C. THOMAS, TEXTBOOK OF ROMAN LAW 389 
(1976). “Things” (res) was a vast category, but within that category were myriad 
subdivisions, including a distinction between movable things (res mobiles) and immovable 
things (res immobiles). Id. at 130–31. “Actions” (actio) were largely procedural, but they 
had a substantive component through their close connection to “obligations.” Id. at 213. 
And the nature of obligations depended on the underlying factual attributes of transactions. 
Id. at 221 (“[T]he principal classification, adopted by Gaius and followed in Justinian’s 
Institutes, is according to the source of the obligation, i.e., the legal fact or transaction from 
which the obligation arises.”). 
  20. As with Roman law, the English common law is too vast a subject to 
describe in a single footnote, but it exhibits the same characteristic of classifying legal rules 
by the underlying factual attributes of transactions. To use an example that we employed 
above, material things are divided into “movables” and “immovables.” See 2 FREDERICK 
POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE 
TIME OF EDWARD I, at 2 (1895). 
The English courts developed an elaborate writ system that regulated the types of 
claims that could be brought before the courts. Each writ had particular factual predicates. 
For example,  
The trespass writs . . . belong to a group of writs used to make 
claims for civil wrongs. The specific phrase used in a particular trespass 
writ described the wrong, which in turn usually entailed proof of 
specific elements, and delimited damages recoverable for the wrong. 
For example, while trespass de bonis asportatis sought damages for the 
carrying away of goods, which could include their value, trespass per 
quod servitium amisit (“whereby he lost the service” [of his servant]) 
was a writ used by a master to claim damages for the loss of a servant's 
services, but could not be used to claim damages for injuries suffered by 
the servant. 
George Van Cleve, Somerset’s Case and Its Antecedents in Imperial Perspective, 24 LAW & 
HIST. REV. 601, 616 n.73 (2006) (alteration in original). 
  21. Llewellyn describes this aspect of legal reasoning: “Our fields of law, our 
patterns of legal thinking, our legal concepts, have grown up each one around some ‘type’ 
of occurrence or transaction, felt as a typical something, seen in due course as a legally 
significant type, and, as a type-picture, made a standard and a norm for judging.” Llewellyn, 
The First Struggle, supra note 2, at 880. 
  22. For purposes of this Essay, we play along with the joke and assume that the 
presence of a horse is not a legally relevant fact, despite some evidence to the contrary. See 
supra note 17. In addition, we observe that the irrelevance of the horse depends on the fact 
that, under current law, animals are for the most part treated like any other personal 
property. One of us, however, has argued rather strongly that this should not be the case. 
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These observations raise an obvious question: which features of human 
interaction provide a distinctive basis for legal analysis? In our view, a new field 
of legal study is justified when a discrete factual setting generates the need for 
distinctive legal solutions. This distinctiveness may manifest itself in the creation 
of a unique set of legal rules or legal practices,23 in the unique expression or 
interaction of more generally applicable legal rules,24 or in unique insights about 
law.25 Under this standard, we will argue that “law and entrepreneurship” merits 
consideration as a separate field of legal study. Before turning to that argument, 
however, we examine Judge Easterbrook’s claims in relation to the Law of the 
Horse to demonstrate the importance of distinctiveness in organizing law. 
I. THE LAW OF THE HORSE 
Judge Easterbrook deployed the Law of the Horse to make a claim about 
the proper organization of law, and we take this claim as our point of departure:  
Far better for most students—better, even, for those who plan to go 
into the horse trade—to take courses in property, torts, commercial 
transactions, and the like, adding to the diet of horse cases a 
smattering of transactions in cucumbers, cats, coal, and cribs. Only 
by putting the law of the horse in the context of broader rules about 
commercial endeavors could one really understand the law about 
horses.26 
Judge Easterbrook’s preference for “property, torts, commercial 
transactions, and the like” as organizational constructs is not completely developed 
in his essay, but he mentions the breadth of those fields as an advantage over the 
                                                                                                                
See generally Darian M. Ibrahim, A Return to Descartes: Property, Profit, and the 
Corporate Ownership of Animals, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 87 (2007); Darian M. 
Ibrahim, Reduce, Refine, Replace: The Failure of the Three R’s and the Future of Animal 
Experimentation, 2006 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 195 (2006); Darian M. Ibrahim, The Anticruelty 
Statute: A Study in Animal Welfare, 1 J. ANIMAL L. & ETHICS 175 (2006). 
  23. When a particular factual setting inspires a distinctive legal rule, we typically 
call that rule a “doctrine,” and we fold that doctrine into an existing collection of doctrines 
that comprise a more-or-less coherent field of study. For example, once legislatures and 
courts recognized that minority shareholders in closely held corporations were vulnerable to 
opportunistic behavior on the part of majority shareholders, both legislatures and courts 
developed the doctrine of minority oppression. See Galler v. Galler, 203 N.E.2d 577 (Ill. 
1964); Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505 (Mass. 1975); F. Hodge O’Neal, 
Close Corporations: Existing Legislation and Recommended Reform, 33 BUS. LAW. 873, 
873–75 (1978) (discussing the development of statutes addressing the special needs of 
shareholders in closely held corporations). On the other hand, when a particular factual 
setting inspires a set of distinctive legal rules, we begin to recognize that factual setting as 
worthy of separate study. All of our modern categories of law—administrative law, family 
law, corporate law, etc.—illustrate this principle. 
  24. See infra notes 76–77 and accompanying text (applying this idea to law and 
entrepreneurship). 
  25. This last tack was taken by Larry Lessig in his response to Judge 
Easterbrook. See Lessig, supra note 10, at 502 (“We see something when we think about the 
regulation of cyberspace that other areas would not show us.”); see also infra notes 89–98 
(applying this idea to law and entrepreneurship).  
  26. Easterbrook, supra note 10, at 208. 
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Law of the Horse. In the law of torts, for example, students encounter cases in an 
infinite variety of contexts, but liability arises from one of three justifications: 
intentional misconduct, negligence, or strict liability.27 Each of these categories 
includes various sub-categories. For example, intentional torts include battery, 
assault, false imprisonment, infliction of mental distress, trespass, and 
conversion.28 At each level of analysis, classification of cases depends on some 
feature of the underlying factual realities (e.g., whether one person touched another 
person).29 
The Law of the Horse would attempt to organize fact scenarios by 
focusing on alternative attributes of the transactions. Rather than asking whether 
one person touched another person, for example, we would ask whether the 
interaction between two people involved a horse. In most instances, classifying 
cases based on the presence of a horse—as opposed to a chicken or a bicycle—is 
utterly nonsensical because the mere presence of a horse reveals nothing 
distinctive that would assist us in resolving actual or potential conflicts among the 
participants in these transactions.30  
When we classify the universe of human interactions, therefore, some 
facts are legally relevant (whether one person touched another person), while other 
facts are not legally relevant (whether the interaction involved a horse).31 Judge 
Easterbrook’s invocation of the Law of the Horse at the “Law of Cyberspace” 
conference, therefore, might be read most sympathetically as nothing more than an 
amusing method of asserting that “cyberspace” is not a legally relevant fact. 
This assertion causes us to reflect on the grounds for elevating certain 
facts above others when classifying cases or transactions. We discern various 
                                                                                                                
  27. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS 31–32 (5th ed. 1984) 
(“The fundamental basis of tort liability may first be divided into three parts . . . .”); cf. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (1965) (following this organizational scheme). The 
American Law Institute (“ALI”) is in the process of replacing parts of the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts with the Restatement (Third) of Torts. To date, the ALI has adopted two 
of the three installments that will comprise the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products 
Liability (1998) and Apportionment of Liability (2000). The third installment, Liability for 
Physical and Emotional Harm, is currently available in draft form. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) 
OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM (Tentative Draft No. 5, 2007). 
  28. KEETON ET AL., supra note 27, at 39–107. 
  29. Our emphasis on the importance of facts to understanding the organization of 
law is not new. Brian Leiter has described the “Core Claim” of the Legal Realists as 
follows: “judges respond primarily to the stimulus of the facts.” Brian Leiter, Rethinking 
Legal Realism: Toward a Naturalized Jurisprudence, 76 TEX. L. REV. 267, 275 (1997). This 
insight allowed Realists to advance “a descriptive theory about the nature of judicial 
decision, according to which . . . judicial decisions fall into (sociologically) determined 
patterns, in which . . . judges reach results based on a (generally shared) response to the 
underlying facts of the case, which . . . they then rationalize after-the-fact with appropriate 
legal rules and reasons.” Id. at 285.  
  30. But see supra notes 17 and 22 and accompanying text. 
  31. In her recent study of the use of language in law schools, Elizabeth Mertz 
highlights the importance of the process by which relevant facts are selected. ELIZABETH 
MERTZ, THE LANGUAGE OF LAW SCHOOL: LEARNING TO “THINK LIKE A LAWYER” 66–74 
(2007). 
78 ARIZONA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 50:71 
circumstances in which legal scholars might be interested in organizing the real 
world along factual dimensions that do not correspond with traditional doctrinal 
categories, though not all such circumstances would justify the creation of a new 
field of legal study. For example, empirical legal scholars may select a sample of 
cases or transactions to gain insights about a theoretical issue,32 or doctrinal legal 
scholars may organize cases around various factual contexts to discern subtle 
differences in the expression of general legal standards.33 Some projects of the 
latter type gain enough momentum to generate freestanding courses, casebooks, 
                                                                                                                
  32. Studies of ranchers in California’s Shasta County, ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, 
ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991), jewelers in midtown 
Manhattan, Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual 
Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992), and tuna merchants in 
Tokyo, Eric A. Feldman, The Tuna Court: Laws and Norms in the World’s Premier Fish 
Market, 94 CAL. L. REV. 313 (2006), might all reveal something interesting about the 
interplay of formal legal rules and procedures, on the one hand, and social norms, on the 
other. But we do not distinguish legally between boundary disputes among ranchers and 
boundary disputes among urban apartment owners or contracts among jewelers and 
contracts among fish merchants. 
  33. For example, prominent realist scholar Leon Green used this approach in 
organizing his “heretical casebook,” THE JUDICIAL PROCESS IN TORT CASES, first published 
in 1931. See Jay M. Feinman, Teaching Economic Torts, 95 KY. L.J. 893, 898 (2006–2007). 
In the first edition of that casebook, Green included chapters on, among other things, 
“Threats, Insults, Blows, Attacks, Wounds, Fights, Restraints, etc.” and “Surgical 
Operations; Treatment, Control, etc., of Sick, Disabled and Irresponsible Persons.” In a 
review of the casebook, James Gifford tried to make sense of the idiosyncratic organization: 
Courts must dispose of cases. For this purpose many devices are 
available. With a variety of devices at their command, it is not as 
important to determine how judges dispose of problems as why. The real 
reasons are rarely, if ever, explicit. May we not discover an explanation 
as to why courts decide as they do by gathering the cases under fact 
categories rather than under categories of legal concepts? This, in my 
opinion, is worth trying. 
James P. Gifford, The Judicial Process In Tort Cases, 41 YALE L.J. 1264, 1266 (1932) 
(book review). 
In a series of law review articles and in later editions of the casebook, Green refined 
his approach, which he referred to as the “relational-interests” approach to tort law. See 
Leon Green, Relational Interests, 29 ILL. L. REV. 460 (1934); Leon Green, Relational 
Interests, 29 ILL. L. REV. 1041 (1935) (trade relations); Leon Green, Relational Interests, 30 
ILL. L. REV. 1 (1935) (commercial relations); Leon Green, Relational Interests, 30 ILL. L. 
REV. 314 (1935) (professional and political relations); Leon Green, Relational Interests, 31 
ILL. L. REV. 35 (1936) (general social relations); Leon Green, Basic Concepts: Persons, 
Property, Relations, 24 A.B.A. J. 65 (1938). Though never widely adopted by torts scholars, 
the “relational-interests” approach to tort law survives in PETER B. KUTNER & OSBORNE M. 
REYNOLDS, JR., ADVANCED TORTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 3–8 (3d ed. 2006). As with the 
empirical studies mentioned above, Green’s decision to organize tort cases according to 
subsidiary facts is not an attempt to create a new field of law but rather to illuminate the 
field of tort law. 
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treatises, articles, and other materials, but are later assimilated into more general 
categories of law or marginalized.34  
The more ambitious motive for organizing cases around factual attributes 
other than those captured by the great headings of the common law is that the new 
system of organization may reveal a set of circumstances deserving more tailored 
attention. Larry Lessig employed this approach in defending cyberlaw from Judge 
Easterbrook’s horse attack. According to Lessig, the distinctive feature of 
cyberspace is “code, or the software and hardware that make cyberspace the way it 
is.”35 Lessig argued that by understanding how code affects behavior in 
cyberspace—and how law affects code—we could gain unique insights on the 
“limits of law as a regulator.”36  
A similar search for distinctiveness was staged by several commentators 
in a recent symposium on health law held at Wake Forest University School of 
Law. For example, Mark Hall attempted to identify “the essential features of health 
care delivery that distinguish its legal issues from those of other related fields.”37 
Likewise, Einer Elhauge was motivated by the question: “do we gain insights from 
thinking as a group about the set of legal materials grouped under this rubric?”38  
Environmental law also has undergone this sort of examination. Richard 
Lazarus, for example, has argued that environmental law presents “special 
challenges” for lawmaking because ecological injury is distinctive.39 Jay Wexler 
responded, “[r]esolution of environmental law disputes frequently calls for nothing 
more than application of general principles of law that themselves are derived 
without much or any consideration of the remarkable features of ecological 
injury.”40 
We could multiply the examples,41 but the pattern is clear: for (nearly) 
every participant in these debates,42 the argument regarding the value of creating or 
maintaining a field of legal study turns on the distinctiveness of the factual context. 
In the following section, we argue that entrepreneurship meets this standard of 
distinctiveness, despite well-known difficulties in defining its boundaries. 
                                                                                                                
  34. See A. Dan Tarlock, Is There a There There in Environmental Law?, 19 J. 
LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 213, 229–30 (2004) (referring to “lens courses” such as Poverty 
Law). 
  35. Lessig, supra note 10, at 509. 
  36. Id. at 502. 
  37. Hall, supra note 8, at 358. 
  38. Elhauge, supra note 6, at 370. 
  39. Richard J. Lazarus, Restoring What’s Environmental About Environmental 
Law in the Supreme Court, 47 UCLA L. REV. 703, 745 (2000). 
  40. Jay D. Wexler, The (Non)Uniqueness of Environmental Law, 74 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 260, 315 (2006). 
  41. See, e.g., Koh, supra note 7, at 306 (“As time moves on, and commerce, 
telecommunications, culture and transport become increasingly globalized, a growing body 
of law and norms will emerge that is, on the one hand, universally recognized, but on the 
other, neither wholly domestic nor wholly international in its character or origin.”).  
  42. A notable exception is Henry Greely, who has argued, “the study of health 
law is both important and fascinating. And that is more than enough to justify spending a 
career on it.” Greely, supra note 6, at 408. 
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II. ENTREPRENEURSHIP THROUGH THE LENS OF LAW 
Entrepreneurship is a real-world phenomenon of great importance. At the 
dot.com market’s peak, entrepreneurial start-up companies backed by venture 
capital accounted for approximately $1.1 trillion in sales or roughly eleven percent 
of our gross domestic product.43 These same companies directly employed over 
12.5 million people.44 If the traditional small businesses and innovative activity 
that occurs within established firms (so-called “intrapreneurship”)45 are also 
defined as entrepreneurial (we address the definitional question below),46 the 
number of entrepreneurs and amount of entrepreneurial activity in society 
balloons.47 At a time when globalization has resulted in the outsourcing of 
                                                                                                                
  43. Robert E. Grady, Managing Dir., the Carlyle Group & Lecturer in Pub. 
Mgmt., Stanford Graduate Sch. of Bus., Testimony Before the U.S. House of 
Representatives Committee on Education and the Work Force, at 2 (March 11, 2004) (citing 
study conducted by Wharton Econometrics/Decision Resources, Inc.). 
  44. Id.; see also Ronald J. Mann, Do Patents Facilitate Financing in the 
Software Industry?, 83 TEX. L. REV. 961 (2005). Professor Mann stated: 
The U.S. software industry is characterized by astonishing 
levels of growth, innovative activity, and competition. Some argue that 
innovation in software and related industries has driven much of the 
innovation in other industries in recent decades. Federal government 
statistics suggest that it is one of the few information technology sectors 
that consistently shows a large trade surplus, and as the pressures of 
globalization dilute the comparative advantage of American employees 
in many sectors, it is worth noting the remarkable level of employment 
growth in the software industry over the last decade, from 854,000 jobs 
in 1992 to more than 2.1 million jobs in 2000 (a 12% annual growth 
rate).  
Id. at 963 (footnotes omitted). 
  45. But see D. Gordon Smith & Masako Ueda, Law and Entrepreneurship: Do 
Courts Matter?, 1 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 353, 356 (2006) (excluding intrapreneurship 
from discussion of “getting novel things done” because intrapreneurship presents different 
issues than start-ups, such as circumventing organizational inertia). 
  46. See infra notes 69–75 and accompanying text. 
  47. We observe that Professor Greely, in justifying a field of health law, 
similarly took note of “the sheer size of health care.” Greely, supra note 6, at 396. He 
observed that in the year 2006 alone: 
[N]early one dollar out of every six spent on goods and services [in the 
United States] will be spent on health care—more than $ 2 trillion in all. 
This sum is noticeably smaller than the GDP of only the United States, 
Japan, and Germany. It is about the same as the GDP of France or the 
United Kingdom. It is clearly larger than the GDP of every other country 
in the world. The health care system will spend about $7,000 this year 
for each man, woman, and child in the United States, affecting the pay 
checks, tax bills, and bank accounts of every American, as well as the 
expenses—and profits—of almost all American businesses.  
Id. at 396–97. He went on to remark that “[t]hat big of an industry generates a lot of law and 
a lot of business for lawyers. Lawyers need to be trained to provide relevant services; 
academics can provide useful analysis and commentary on the laws governing health care.” 
Id. at 397. 
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manufacturing and service jobs,48 and United States financial markets are 
experiencing strong competition from foreign rivals,49 some have argued that 
entrepreneurship provides the competitive advantage for the United States moving 
forward.50 Moreover, entrepreneurship offers psychic benefits for those who wish 
to be their own boss or take great risk in the hopes of great reward.51 The 
entrepreneur has a certain mythological importance in the pursuit of the American 
dream.52 
Scholars working in numerous fields have recognized the importance of 
entrepreneurship and have set out to explore it through their own particular lenses. 
According to Scott Shane, “any effort to provide a conceptual framework for 
entrepreneurship seems to require an interdisciplinary approach. The domains of 
psychology, sociology and economics all seem to provide insight into a piece of 
the puzzle, but none seem to explain the phenomenon completely.”53 For instance, 
the field of economics, and specifically the literature on vertical integration and the 
boundaries of the firm, informs the means by which entrepreneurs choose to 
exploit opportunities for profit—whether through start-ups, established firms, or 
market transactions.54 Similarly, the notion of entrepreneurs as risk-takers draws 
from the psychology literature and peers into “the entrepreneurial mind.”55  
Though academic economists, psychologists, sociologists, and scholars 
from other disciplines have made greater contributions to the entrepreneurship 
literature than legal scholars, the development of “law and entrepreneurship” as a 
field may be inevitable. After all, the effect of law on entrepreneurship is 
important to both policy makers seeking to promote entrepreneurial activities56 and 
                                                                                                                
  48. See THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE WORLD IS FLAT: A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE 
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 282 (2005). 
  49. See Aaron Lucchetti, NYSE, via Euronext, Aims to Regain Its Appeal for 
International Listings, WALL ST. J., June 30, 2006, at C1 (noting that 11 of the top 25 
foreign IPOs were listed on the major U.S. stock exchanges in 2000, but that this figure 
dropped significantly after the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, down to three of 
the 25 largest foreign IPOs in 2004 and none of the 25 largest foreign IPOs in 2005). 
  50. See generally CARL J. SCHRAMM, THE ENTREPRENEURIAL IMPERATIVE (2006). 
  51. See infra note 55 and accompanying text (on entrepreneurs as risk-takers). 
  52. See Joseph Bankman & Ronald J. Gilson, Why Start-ups?, 51 STAN. L. REV. 
289, 289–90 (1999) (observing that the entrepreneurial myth holds a particular allure in 
Silicon Valley). 
  53. SCOTT SHANE, A GENERAL THEORY OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP: THE INDIVIDUAL-
OPPORTUNITY NEXUS 10 (2003). 
  54. See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND 
ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS (1975); OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF 
CAPITALISM: FIRMS, MARKETS, RELATIONAL CONTRACTING (1985); R.H. Coase, The Nature 
of The Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937). 
  55. See generally Robert H. Brockhaus, Sr., The Psychology of the Entrepreneur, 
in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP 39–71 (Calvin A. Kent et al. eds., 1982). 
  56. Some policy makers, for example, have sought to use tax laws to entice more 
funding for early stage start-ups. See Colleen DeBaise, On Angels’ Wings, WALL ST. J., 
Mar. 19, 2007, at R6 (discussing proposed “Access to Capital for Entrepreneurs Act of 
2006,” which would have provided a 25% tax credit for angel investing). Laws that would 
provide tax incentives for start-up investment might enable more start-ups to receive 
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lawyers counseling clients involved in them. Lawyers, for instance, must be able to 
advise when it is safe for entrepreneurial employees to leave their current 
employers and go it alone without violating a non-competition agreement, a 
confidentiality agreement, trade secret law, and the corporate opportunity 
doctrine,57 they must counsel start-ups on how to raise funds from angel investors 
and venture capitalists without violating securities laws,58 and they must counsel 
entrepreneurs and financiers on investment contract design.59 
Connections between law and entrepreneurship have attracted interest 
from non-legal scholars. Gordon Smith and Masako Ueda observe, for example, 
that “the study of law and entrepreneurship has flourished among economists.”60 In 
particular, they point to the interest among economists in laws protecting 
intellectual property and laws protecting investors.61 But there have been notable 
attempts by legal scholars to add a “law matters” component to the 
entrepreneurship discussion. An important example is found in Ronald Gilson’s 
explanation for Silicon Valley’s comparative success over Boston’s Route 128.62 
While AnnaLee Saxenian first explored the issue and attributed Silicon Valley’s 
advantage to its progressive cultural norms,63 Professor Gilson offered a legal 
explanation: California refused to enforce non-competition agreements but 
Massachusetts did not.64 Professor Gilson argued that California’s law allowed for 
unfettered mobility among Silicon Valley’s entrepreneurial employees, which in 
turn led to robust start-up activity and knowledge spillover, while Massachusetts’ 
law had the opposite effect.  
Professor Gilson’s contribution and others like it65 begin to help us 
understand connections between law and entrepreneurship. But we believe that 
                                                                                                                
funding, but might also increase moral hazard by enticing investment in companies that 
would not be funded absent the subsidy. 
  57. See infra notes 62–64 and 90–91 and accompanying text. 
  58. This advice includes finding an exemption from public registration of the 
offering and complying with the SEC’s ban on general solicitation in exempt offerings. 
  59. See Ronald J. Gilson, Engineering a Venture Capital Market: Lessons from 
the American Experience, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1067, 1078–85 (2003) (describing the five 
common features of venture capital investment contracts); Darian M. Ibrahim, The (Not So) 
Puzzling Behavior of Angel Investors, 61 VAND. L. REV. (forthcoming 2008) (on angel 
investment contract design). 
  60. Smith & Ueda, supra note 45, at 357. 
  61. Id. at 358–63. 
  62. See generally Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of High Technology 
Industrial Districts: Silicon Valley, Route 128, and Covenants Not to Compete, 74 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 575 (1999). 
  63. See generally ANNALEE SAXENIAN, REGIONAL ADVANTAGE: CULTURE AND 
COMPETITION IN SILICON VALLEY AND ROUTE 128 (1994). 
  64. Gilson, supra note 62, at 578. 
  65. See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz, The Danger of Underdeveloped Patent 
Prospects, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 1065 (2007) (exploring the potential danger of patent 
underdevelopment for inventions in their earliest stages); John R. Allison et al., Software 
Patents, Incumbents, and Entry, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1579 (2007) (examining the relationship 
between patents and the different business models used in the software industry); Kenneth 
Ayotte, Bankruptcy and Entrepreneurship: The Value of a Fresh Start, 23 J.L. ECON. & 
ORG. 161 (2007) (arguing that bankrupt entrepreneurial firms are a better fit for the “fresh 
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much more remains to be learned about entrepreneurship when viewed through the 
lens of law, and we hope that more legal scholars will pursue the study of these 
connections. Next we turn to what we might learn about the law when it is viewed 
through the lens of entrepreneurship. 
III. THE DISTINCTIVENESS OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP FOR LEGAL 
STUDY 
Earlier we argued that a new field of legal study is justified when a 
discrete factual setting generates the need for distinctive legal solutions, whether 
                                                                                                                
start” provided by Chapter 13 than the absolute priority rule provided by Chapter 11); 
Douglas G. Baird & Edward R. Morrison, Serial Entrepreneurs and Small Business 
Bankruptcies, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 2310 (2005) (critiquing Chapter 11’s focus on 
businesses rather than entrepreneurs as providing incentives for serial entrepreneurs to stay 
with failing businesses rather than start new ones); Bankman & Gilson, supra note 52 
(explaining why employees leave employers and form start-ups despite employers’ seeming 
tax, information, and scope advantages for keeping ideas in-house); Victor Fleischer, The 
Rational Exuberance of Structuring Venture Capital Start-ups, 57 TAX L. REV. 137 (2003) 
(explaining why venture-backed firms are structured as corporations rather than pass-
through entities); Jesse M. Fried & Mira Ganor, Agency Costs of Venture Capitalist Control 
in Startups, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 967 (2006) (revealing that venture capital investment in 
start-ups in exchange for preferred stock creates a unique corporate governance structure 
and the risk of preferred shareholder opportunism); George S. Geis, Business Outsourcing 
and the Agency Cost Problem, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 955 (2007) (contending that 
business outsourcing poses an agency cost problem but has thrived in recent years in part 
because outsourcing firms have learned to mitigate agency costs through the use of staged 
contractual commitment, redundant agents, incentive-compatible compensation, exit rights, 
and other techniques); Gilson, supra note 59 (claiming that the three necessary factors to a 
successful venture capital market are entrepreneurs, capital, and specialized financial 
intermediaries); Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of 
Organizational Law, 110 YALE L.J. 387 (2000) (contending that affirmative asset 
partitioning, the reverse of limited liability, prevents an individual’s creditors from going 
after firm assets and thus entices creditors to contract with firms); Robert M. Lawless, Small 
Business and the 2005 Bankruptcy Law: Should Mom and Apple Pie Be Worried?, 31 S. 
ILL. U. L.J. 585 (2007) (showing that the 2005 bankruptcy law reforms disadvantaged small 
businesses); Leandra Lederman, The Entrepreneurship Effect: An Accidental Externality in 
the Federal Income Tax, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1401 (2004) (arguing that the federal income tax 
system provides a subsidy for entrepreneurship over passive investment activity); Amir N. 
Licht, The Entrepreneurial Spirit and What the Law Can Do About It, 28 COMP. LAB. L. & 
POL’Y J. 817 (2007) (examining ways in which law might be used to promote 
entrepreneurial activity); Mann, supra note 44 (considering the pros and cons of patents in 
the software industry, including the role of patents in attracting venture capital funding); 
Robert P. Merges, A Transactional View of Property Rights, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1477 
(2005) (detailing the ways in which property rights facilitate contracting); Larry E. Ribstein, 
The Important Role of Non-Organization Law, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 751, 789 (2005) 
(arguing that business organization laws have been relatively unimportant in shaping 
business associations compared to tax, bankruptcy, and other non-organizational laws); 
James C. Spindler, IPO Liability and Entrepreneurial Response, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1187 
(2007) (contending that the liability regime created by the Securities Act of 1933 
inefficiently allocates risk to entrepreneurs rather than IPO investors, who could diversify 
that risk, with the result being that entrepreneurs distort their behavior in non-wealth 
enhancing ways). 
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manifested in the creation of a unique set of legal rules or legal practices, in the 
unique expression or interaction of more generally applicable legal rules, or in 
unique insights about law.66 We now contend that entrepreneurship is distinctive in 
precisely this way. Here, we revisit Professor Lessig’s argument in favor of 
cyberlaw: “I am not defending the law of the horse. My claim is specific to 
cyberspace. We see something when we think about the regulation of cyberspace 
that other areas would not show us.”67 While Lessig’s particular answer for 
cyberspace—that it reveals law’s limits as a regulator68—is not our own answer, 
we propose the study of law and entrepreneurship for the same general reason: 
because entrepreneurship is not only an interesting fact, but a legally relevant one. 
Why might this be so? For starters, entrepreneurship reveals how the law 
deals with novelty. Joseph Schumpeter has argued that novelty is the distinguishing 
attribute of entrepreneurship.69 Entrepreneurship involves new products or 
services, new ways of organizing, or new geographic markets.70 Conversely, 
improvements in existing processes or within existing “means-ends frameworks” 
do not constitute entrepreneurship because they do not exhibit novelty.71 But other 
fields also show us how law deals with novelty. Patent law, for example, embraces 
“novelty” as one of the core elements of patentability.72 Entrepreneurship finds its 
true distinctiveness, then, not in novelty alone, but in novelty as applied to 
opportunities.  
In fact, entrepreneurship is often defined as the discovery, evaluation, and 
exploitation of opportunities,73 and novelty is implicit in the notion of 
entrepreneurial opportunities.74 Entrepreneurial opportunities may be novel in a 
                                                                                                                
  66. See supra notes 23–25 and accompanying text. 
  67. Lessig, supra note 10, at 502. 
  68. Id. (“[G]eneral point is about the limits on law as a regulator and about the 
techniques for escaping those limits.”). 
  69. Smith & Ueda, supra note 45, at 354 (citing JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, THE 
THEORY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: AN INQUIRY INTO PROFITS, CAPITAL, CREDIT, 
INTEREST, AND THE BUSINESS CYCLE 76 (Redvers Opie trans., 3d prtg., Harvard Univ. Press 
1949) (1934)).  
  70. SCHUMPETER, supra note 69, at 66. 
  71. See Jonathan T. Eckhardt & Scott A. Shane, Opportunities and 
Entrepreneurship, 29 J. MGMT. 333, 336 (2003) (contending that the entrepreneur constructs 
a new means-end framework). 
  72. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2000); see also John F. Duffy, Inventing Invention: A Case 
Study of Legal Innovation, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1, 9 (2007) (“[P]atent law has always required 
novelty as a substantial element of the creative standard that must be met.”).  
  73. See SHANE, supra note 53, at 4 (“Entrepreneurship is an activity that involves 
the discovery, evaluation, and exploitation of opportunities to introduce new goods and 
services, ways of organizing, markets, processes, and raw materials through organizing 
efforts that previously had not existed.”); Eckhardt & Shane, supra note 71, at 336 (“[W]e 
define entrepreneurship as the discovery, evaluation, and exploitation of future goods and 
services. This definition suggests that, as a scholarly field, entrepreneurship involves the 
study of opportunities.” (citation omitted)); Scott Shane & S. Venkataraman, The Promise 
of Entrepreneurship as a Field of Research, 25 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 217, 218–19 (2000) 
(resisting a narrower definition of entrepreneurship that focuses only on the creation of new 
firms or the individual traits of entrepreneurs such as risk-taking). 
  74. See supra note 69. 
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strong sense, which typically implies a technological breakthrough backed by 
venture capital financing, or they may be novel in a weak sense, such as opening a 
new restaurant in a vacant building.75 As the novelty of the opportunity increases, 
so does the unique challenge it might present the legal system, which in turn can 
lead to the greater need for distinctive legal rules or legal practices to govern that 
opportunity. 
We are now in a position to ask two further questions about the 
distinctiveness of entrepreneurship for purposes of legal analysis. First, is a distinct 
set of legal rules or legal practices implicated in connection with entrepreneurial 
opportunities? Second, if so, does clustering those rules or practices and thinking 
about them as a collective unit, apart from any current doctrinal confines, offer 
unique insights about law? The remainder of this Essay will offer preliminary 
answers to both of these questions. 
Transactions relating to entrepreneurial opportunities often require 
something other than the routine application of general principles of tort, contract, 
or property law. In some instances, general rules of law find novel expression in 
the entrepreneurial context. In other instances, legal rules and practices are tailored 
to the entrepreneurial context. While explicating the full body of “entrepreneurship 
law” is beyond the scope of this Essay, we offer several illustrative examples from 
recent legal scholarship. These examples concern both legal rules and legal 
practices. 
Consider again Professor Gilson’s work on the mobility of 
entrepreneurial employees. Professor Gilson observed that California’s refusal to 
enforce non-competition agreements was accompanied by the concern that trade 
secret law—in particular a line of cases on “inevitable disclosure”—might serve as 
the basis for a backdoor constraint on competition.76 What is most interesting 
about this analysis, for our purposes, is Professor Gilson’s decision to combine two 
legal rules from different doctrinal categories—the rules governing non-
competition agreements from employment law and the rules governing trade 
secrets from intellectual property law—to illuminate the effect of law on the 
mobility of entrepreneurial employees.77 The interplay of such generally applicable 
rules forms a distinctive slice of entrepreneurship law. Thus, the act of compiling a 
body of entrepreneurship law can entail reshuffling the deck, extracting laws from 
their current doctrinal categories and creating a new category. 
In Professor Gilson’s work, the general rules governing non-competition 
agreements and trade secrets find novel expression in the entrepreneurial context. 
But legal rules may also be tailored to fit the entrepreneurial context. Some 
prominent examples are found in the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(“SEC”) rules that allow companies to raise capital in private offerings. These 
                                                                                                                
  75. See D. Gordon Smith & Darian M. Ibrahim, Law and Entrepreneurial 
Opportunities (working paper, on file with authors) (expanding on these ideas of 
entrepreneurial opportunities in both the strong and weak senses, both of which may be 
considered entrepreneurial in nature). 
  76. Gilson, supra note 62, at 622–26. 
  77. See also Charles Tait Graves & James A. DiBoise, Do Strict Trade Secret 
Laws and Non-Competition Laws Obstruct Innovation?, 1 ENTREP. BUS. L.J. 323 (2006). 
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rules include, in particular, the exemptions from public registration contained in 
Regulation D, which allow entrepreneurs to avoid the expensive and cumbersome 
public offering process when seeking initial funding.78 On the other hand, critics 
argue that the SEC could do even more to facilitate start-up funding, including 
relaxing the ban on general solicitation in certain Regulation D offerings79 and 
excepting smaller companies from some of the more onerous requirements of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.80 These arguments implicitly recognize 
entrepreneurship as an important organizational category. 
The foregoing examples concern legal rules, but we must also be mindful 
of legal practices. Our references to “legal practices” in this Essay are intended to 
convey the idea that the study of law and entrepreneurship need not be limited to 
consideration of legal doctrine.81 For example, a substantial literature on the 
structure of venture capital relationships has developed over the past few decades. 
Work by sociologists82 and economists83 laid the foundation for later work by legal 
                                                                                                                
  78. Most notably, Regulation D contains Rules 504, 505, and 506 which provide 
safe harbors for offerings that meet certain parameters. For an economic analysis of public 
offering exemptions, see C. Steven Bradford, Transaction Exemptions in the Securities Act 
of 1933: An Economic Analysis, 45 EMORY L.J. 591 (1996) (noting that such exemptions are 
efficient on the whole, although parts are problematic). 
  79. See, e.g., Mark A. Sargent, The New Regulation D: Deregulation, 
Federalism and the Dynamics of Regulatory Reform, 68 WASH. U. L.Q. 225, 299–302 
(1990) (questioning the need for the ban on general solicitation); William K. Sjostrom, Jr., 
Relaxing the Ban: It’s Time to Allow General Solicitation and Advertising in Exempt 
Offerings, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 3–4 (2004) (arguing that the SEC should allow general 
solicitation in private offerings). 
  80. See HENRY N. BUTLER & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE SARBANES-OXLEY 
DEBACLE: WHAT WE’VE LEARNED; HOW TO FIX IT 91–92 (2006) (arguing that Congress 
should amend Sarbanes-Oxley to exempt small firms or to allow them to opt into or out of 
the Act’s provisions); Joseph A. Castelluccio III, Note, Sarbanes-Oxley and Small Business: 
Section 404 and the Case for a Small Business Exemption, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 429 (2005) 
(arguing in favor of a small business exemption from Sarbanes-Oxley Section 404, the 
costly internal controls provision). 
  81. For a discussion of the empirical study of contracts, including contracts in an 
entrepreneurial setting, see D. Gordon Smith & Brayden G. King, Contracts as 
Organizations (Univ. of Wis. Legal Studies Research Paper No. 1037, 2007), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=969816.  
  82. See, e.g., Lauren B. Edelman & Mark C. Suchman, The Legal Environments 
of Organizations, 23 ANN. REV. SOCIOLOGY 479 (1997); Mark C. Suchman & Mia L. Cahill, 
The Hired Gun as Facilitator: Lawyers and the Suppression of Business Disputes in Silicon 
Valley, 21 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 679, 694–96 (1996); Mark C. Suchman, Daniel J. Steward & 
Clifford A. Westfall, The Legal Environment of Entrepreneurship, in THE 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP DYNAMIC 349 (Claudia Bird Schoonhoven & Elaine Romanelli eds., 
2001); Mark C. Suchman, On Advice of Counsel: Law Firms and Venture Capital Funds as 
Information Intermediaries in the Structuration of Silicon Valley (February 1994) 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University) (on file with authors). 
  83. See, e.g., Steven Kaplan & Per Strömberg, Financial Contracting Theory 
Meets the Real World: An Empirical Analysis of Venture Capital Contracts, 70 REV. ECON. 
STUD. 281 (2003); see also Erik Berglöf, A Control Theory of Venture Capital Finance, 10 
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 247 (1994); Paul A. Gompers, Optimal Investment, Monitoring, and the 
Staging of Venture Capital, 50 J. FIN. 1461 (1995); Thomas Hellman, The Allocation of 
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scholars.84 While the study of venture capital relationships may hold lessons for 
other economic and social relationships, the unique attributes of venture capital 
contracting stem from the unique problems that arise in the pursuit of 
entrepreneurial opportunities.  
Victor Fleischer provides another example of legal practices driven by the 
entrepreneurial context: the choice-of-entity decision for entrepreneurial firms 
backed by venture capital.85 Traditional choice-of-entity analysis dictates a pass-
through entity for the entrepreneurial firm. A pass-through entity, such as a limited 
liability company, allows founders to avoid double taxation on firm gains and 
offset firm losses against taxable income from other sources.86 Professor Fleischer 
shows, however, that venture capitalists prefer the corporate structure for 
entrepreneurial firms for several reasons, most notably because firm losses are not 
as valuable to venture fund investors as they might first appear.87 Also, while firm 
gains are unlikely in the early years of most venture-backed firms (where any 
revenue is likely expended in the development of the firm and its products), 
Professor Fleischer observes that the corporate structure also offers some tax 
advantages for gains.88 In sum, Professor Fleischer’s effort reveals that legal 
practices concerning choice of entity in the entrepreneurial context are driven by 
the unique nature of venture capital. In our view, all of this work belongs to the 
genre of law and entrepreneurship and also begins to develop its contours. 
This analysis of entrepreneurship as distinctive leads to our second 
question: does our focus on legal rules and legal practices related to 
entrepreneurship reveal something unique about law? In Lessig’s terms, does 
entrepreneurship show us something about law that we would otherwise 
overlook?89 On one level, the study of entrepreneurship law allows us to focus on 
the interplay between disparate rules and practices, adopted for other reasons and 
in other contexts, and ask whether as a whole they produce the optimal effect on 
entrepreneurial activity. For instance, if California’s refusal to enforce non-
competition covenants is encouraging knowledge spillover and has contributed to 
the success of Silicon Valley, policymakers may be wary of allowing trade secret 
law to hamper that process. On another level, the study of entrepreneurship law 
                                                                                                                
Control Rights in Venture Capital Contracts, 29 RAND J. ECON. 57 (1998); William A. 
Sahlman, The Structure and Governance of Venture-Capital Organizations, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 
473 (1990). 
  84. See, e.g., Robert P. Bartlett, III, Venture Capital, Agency Costs, and the 
False Dichotomy of the Corporation, 54 UCLA L. REV. 37 (2006); William W. Bratton, 
Venture Capital on the Downside: Preferred Stock and Corporate Control, 100 MICH. L. 
REV. 891 (2002); Ronald J. Gilson & David M. Schizer, Understanding Venture Capital 
Structure: A Tax Explanation for Convertible Preferred Stock, 116 HARV. L. REV. 874 
(2003); D. Gordon Smith, The Exit Structure of Venture Capital, 53 UCLA L. REV. 315 
(2005). 
  85. See supra notes 43–47 and accompanying text (entrepreneurial firms might 
include both venture-backed start-ups and traditional small businesses depending on how 
broadly entrepreneurship is defined). 
  86. Fleischer, supra note 65, at 143–47. 
  87. Id. at 151–63. 
  88. Id. at 163–67. 
  89. Lessig, supra note 10, at 502. 
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shows us how legal rules and practices address a particular type of novelty—
entrepreneurial opportunities. What precisely it shows us is a more complicated 
question that we do not seek to fully answer in this Essay. We do contend, 
however, that at the very least the study of law and entrepreneurship reveals how 
legal rules and practices shape entrepreneurial opportunities and how legal rules 
and practices adapt to entrepreneurial opportunities.  
In a working paper, we address how legal doctrine shapes entrepreneurial 
opportunities.90 The thrust of our argument is that law allocates the right to exploit 
opportunities between competing, would-be entrepreneurs through the granting of 
“property rights” (in an economic sense) and, in doing so, shapes the very form of 
the opportunities we see exploited. An entrepreneur may want to exploit 
Opportunity X, but because another’s property rights include this opportunity, he 
exploits Opportunity Y instead. We also illustrate the law’s shaping function with 
a detailed examination of various legal doctrines, including the “corporate 
opportunity doctrine,” which allocates the right to exploit entrepreneurial 
opportunities between corporate fiduciaries (officers and directors) and the 
corporations they work for. Because the law deems certain opportunities, perhaps 
those related to the corporation’s current business, off limits to the fiduciary, that 
individual will shape the “opportunity” he exploits to fall outside of the 
corporation’s current business. For example, an executive for the LA Fitness 
health club corporation may wish to independently open a health club in a vacant 
building, but because health clubs are his corporation’s business, he may be forced 
to open a sporting goods or nutrition store instead.91 
In another paper, Gordon Smith and Masako Ueda use the vehicle of 
entrepreneurship to suggest how the law adapts to entrepreneurial opportunities.92 
While the law is often slow to respond to novelty,93 Smith and Ueda suggest ways 
in which law might accommodate novel businesses. Their argument begins with 
courts, which “may have an important influence over the level of entrepreneurship 
in a given region or country.”94 They recognize that courts “may facilitate the 
evolution of legal rules to address novel issues raised by entrepreneurial firms,” 
                                                                                                                
  90. Smith & Ibrahim, supra note 75. 
  91. Notice that these ideas can be added to Professor Gilson’s to further define 
the distinctive body of entrepreneurship law concerning the rights and obligations of 
entrepreneurial employees with respect to their current and former employers. That body of 
law consists, at a minimum, of the law governing non-competition agreements, trade secret 
law, patent law, and the corporate opportunity doctrine. Of course, not all of these laws will 
be implicated in each case of employee mobility. For instance, the corporate opportunity 
doctrine will not usually apply to employees other than officers and directors, and patent 
law will not apply absent a patentable innovation. 
  92. Smith & Ueda, supra note 45. 
  93. See, e.g., Jay P. Kesan & Thomas S. Ulen, Foreword: Intellectual Property 
Challenges in the Next Century, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 57, 57 (noting that law has been slow 
to respond to changes brought about by the modern information age); Maria Pellegrino, 
Murder In A Petri Dish? The Wrath Of Illinois’ Miller v. American Infertility Group: A 
Push For Legislative Action, 13 BUFF. WOMEN’S L.J. 137, 140 (2004–2005) (“As with many 
other areas of the law, science has rapidly progressed in the area of reproductive technology 
while our laws have been slow to change or respond.”). 
  94. Smith & Ueda, supra note 45, at 364. 
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which they dub the “adaptability hypothesis.”95 In common law countries, courts 
might adapt to novelty through either interpretation or innovation.96 In other 
words, courts might interpret laws differently for purposes of “keeping pace with 
the changes incited by entrepreneurial firms.”97 They might also innovate by 
creating new laws to apply to novel behavior, although this is a more drastic step 
and will probably be less common.98  
In each of these ways, then, we see something important about how legal 
rules and practices address entrepreneurial opportunities. Interesting questions 
remain, including: in what other ways do legal rules and practices mold and 
respond to entrepreneurial opportunities, and is legal doctrine having more of an 
effect on entrepreneurship or is entrepreneurship having more of an effect on legal 
doctrine?99 But the critical point is that entrepreneurship is distinctive, in ways that 
are legally relevant, and as a result, entrepreneurship is worthy of separate legal 
analysis. 
CONCLUSION 
“Law and entrepreneurship” is an emerging field of study. Skeptics might 
wonder whether law and entrepreneurship is a variant of that old canard, the Law 
of the Horse. In this Essay, we defend law and entrepreneurship against that charge 
and urge legal scholars to become even more engaged in the wide-ranging 
scholarly discourse regarding entrepreneurship. In making our case, we argue that 
research at the intersection of entrepreneurship and law is distinctive. In some 
instances, legal rules and practices are tailored to the entrepreneurial context, and 
in other instances, general rules of law find novel expression in the entrepreneurial 
context. As a result, studying connections between law and entrepreneurship offers 
unique insights about them both. 
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  98. Id. at 368. 
  99. Here we raise, but do not answer, an interesting question of causation. 
Certainly some important legal rules that affect entrepreneurial activity were not designed 
for that purpose. See Gilson, supra note 62, at 613–19 (California’s prohibition of non-
competition laws was a historical anomaly that had nothing to do with promoting 
entrepreneurship). In these instances, law is affecting entrepreneurship rather than vice 
versa. On the other hand, the entrepreneurial setting has resulted in distinct changes in legal 
practice. See supra notes 85–88 and accompanying text on choice of entity for venture-
backed firms. In these instances, entrepreneurship is affecting law. 
